WELFARE RIGHTS
AKIRA OSUKA*

I
INTRODUCTION

Under the Constitution of Japan, social rights, as well as civil liberties,
constitute important parts of the guarantee of "fundamental human rights."
Specifically, social rights consist of the right to a decent life provided for in
Article 25 of the Constitution, the right to receive education provided for in
Article 26, the right to work provided for in Article 27, and the basic legal
rights of labor provided for in Article 28. The term "social rights" comes
from the term soziales Grundrecht used in German public law. By contrast, in
American public law, although the term "social rights" appears occasionally,
it is not generally used. In Japan, the term "welfare rights" is considered to
mean the right to a decent life, which is one of the social rights. I would like
to discuss the development of the right to a decent life in Japan before and
after World War II.
II
THE POVERTY LAW SYSTEM UNDER THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION

The basic characteristics of the poverty law system before the war reflected
the basic structure of the Meiji Constitution. Under the Meiji Constitution,
there was no room for the concept of a constitutionally guaranteed right to a
decent life. This result was natural given the time of establishment of the
Meiji Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, and given the fact that
the Meiji Constitution was modeled on the Prussian Constitution of 1850. In
addition, it has been said that the guarantee of fundamental human rights
under the Meiji Constitution was almost meaningless because the civil
liberties of the people, who were mere tools of the emperor under the Meiji
Constitution, were few and were subject to any restriction imposed by
legislation. The protection of citizens' civil liberties was thus legally
insufficient; therefore, it was quite natural that a right to receive welfare
benefits on the part of the poor, whose social status was much lower than that
of ordinary citizens, was not accepted as a legal right.
The Poverty Law of 1874 (Jyutsukyu-Kisoku),' the first legislation
concerning aid to the poor, did not change past practice. The poverty the
Jyutsukyu-Kisoku intended to cover was only that based on individual factors,
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such as laziness; social factors were not at all taken into account. The law
reflected the dominant idea that the poor in need of aid were not highly
valued as human beings. Therefore, the groups to be aided were severely
restricted to such people as the physically disabled and the seriously ill over
seventy years of age. Even then, the amount of money supplied to such
people was quite small. There was no room for the concept that aiding the
poor was the obligation of society or the state; aid was instead regarded as a
mere favor.
As a result, the state espoused the dominant view that aiding the poor was
to be done primarily by family members, friends, or neighbors, and that the
state should engage in such activity only when support by such people was
entirely impossible. This view is demonstrated by the preamble to the
Jyutsukyu-Kisoku, which stated that aid should be accomplished by the "kindly
feelings of the people" and by the fact that, although the Jyutsukyu-Kisoku
provided that the financial burden necessary for such aid should be borne by
the national treasury, the amount paid from the national treasury was reduced
greatly toward the later stages of the Taisho Era (1912-1925).2
It is further worth noting that the absolute power of the state, based on the
emperor system, contributed to the situation described above. The emperor
controlled the three branches of government by means of his sovereignty,
which was religiously ordained by order of the gods. Because the emperor
was regarded as sacred and inviolable, his power was regarded as absolute.
Therefore, the people, as subjects, were obliged entirely to obey the emperor,
and the guarantee of the people's rights and freedoms was merely his favor,
which was only recognized within the framework of the emperor's
sovereignty. As a result, the poor had no right to be aided and any grant by
the imperial state to the poor was a favor. This premodern character of the
system for aiding the poor facilitated the imperial nation's execution of its
foremost national policy priority: enhancing the wealth and military strength
of the country.
As time passed, the Jyutsukyu-Kisoku became insufficient for meeting the
demands of the times, and the government implemented the Poverty Law
(Kyugo-ho) in 1932. The Kyugo-ho, which was based on the premise that
aiding the poor was the obligation of the state, implemented improvements,
including allocating half of the funds for poverty aid from the national
treasury, expanding the kinds of aid available, and refining the content of the
2. T. SAKAYORI, SHAKAIHOSH6 119-20 (1974) states the following:
On account of the financial retrenchment policy to control the inflation occurring after the
Russo-Japanese War, the poverty law was amended in May 1908, through an official notice
by the Japanese Government to the effect that the expenses should be borne primarily by
city, town and village governments. The prefectural treasuries were to bear the expense to
the extent that the financial resources of the local governments prove insufficient, and the
national treasury would bear any additional expense which the prefectural treasuries could
not accommodate. As a result, the expenditure of the national treasury was greatly reduced
and according to data for 1921, relief expenditures borne by the national treasury
amounted to Y42,822, which was less than 10% of the total relief expenditures of
Y443,395.
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aid. However, the poor were still not recognized as having a legal right to be
aided; the class eligible for the aid remained limited to those who were
incapable of working, and the people who received the aid had no right to
vote and no right to hold office. In effect, the law was still premodern in its
3
nature and content
III
THE GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO A DECENT LIFE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN

The Constitution of Japan was promulgated in 1947, as a faithful
execution of the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, in which Japan accepted defeat in
World War II. The Constitution, the central tenets of which are pacifism and
democracy, provided in Article 25 for the right to a decent life. The
protection of social rights, including the right to a decent life, has been valued
highly because it represents a fundamental qualitative change in the
traditional means of protecting human rights and gives substantive protection
to civil liberties. In the draft of amendments to the Meiji Constitution first
submitted by the Japanese government, there was a sole provision
corresponding to current section 2 of Article 25, which stated that "in all
spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and
extension of social welfare and security, and of public health." Current
section 1, providing that "[a]ll people shall have the right to maintain the
minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living," was added later
during the discussions of the Constitutional Diet (Kenpou Gikai), upon
proposal by the Socialist Party. It is well-known that this provision was based
on the wording, "the people shall have the right to maintain the standards of
wholesome and cultured living," in the draft constitution drawn up by the
Society for the Study of the Constitution (Kenpou Kenkyukai), a group
4
consisting of seven scholars.
It is also well-known that the first draft of the Constitution was written by
the Government section (Minseikyoku) of the General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, which was mainly under the
control of the United States, and that the American New Dealers contributed
to it. Moreover, an examination of this draft of the Constitution clearly
illustrates that the experiences of "constitutional revolution" in the United
States during the New Deal era were incorporated into the Japanese
3.

M. HAYASHI & A. KOGA, GENDAI SHAKAIHOSH6H6 RON 82 (1968); NIHONSHAKAIIIGY6-

DAIGAKU KYUHINSEIDO KENKYTJKAI, NIHON NO KYUHINSEIDO (1960); T. SAKAYORI, supra note 2, at 115.

4. The fact is beyond controversy that the constitutional draft proposed by Kenpou Kenkyukai
enunciated some indispensable principles providing a basis for free democratic government in Japan.
But there is a difference of opinion over the practical effect of that draft. Some conservative groups,
for example, regard Kenpou Kenkyukai's view as a utopian ideal that had no influence on average
people. Some progressive scholars emphasize that, from a historical point of view, Kenpou Kenkyukai's
work was the first attempt to express the will of the Japanese people themselves in making a liberal
constitution. See T. SATO, 2 NIHONKOKU KENP6 SEIRITSU SHI 830-31 (1964); Suzuki, Kenpou Kenkyukai
no Kenpou Sian Kisi, 31 AICHI DAIGAKU H6KEI RONSHO 214, 216 (1960).
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Constitution. That is to say, Article 31 of the Constitution, which guarantees
due process of law, stipulates that "no person shall be deprived of life or
liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to
procedure established by law." This phrase is a direct descendant of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Comparing the two, however, we see that among the objects to be
protected by due process of law, "property," which is included in the United
States' fifth amendment, was excluded from the Constitution of Japan; only
"life" and "liberty" were included. The reasons are as follows: Certain
statutes enacted in the United States during the New Deal era that restricted
property rights by regulating employment agreements and monopolistic
pricing were, at first, considered unjust deprivations of property rights, and
were declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. Then, in
the latter half of the 1930s, judgments affirming the constitutionality of such
statutes were rendered. Japanese constitutional thought accepted restrictions
on property rights in support of the public welfare and also recognized the
necessity of direct state intervention in social and economic processes. Japan,
through Article 31 of the Constitution, accepted the rule that had been
established in the United States by way of interpretation of its Constitution by
its Supreme Court. Thus, social rights, including the right to a decent life,
though formally modeled on the Weimar Constitution, substantially
incorporate the fruits of the New Deal in the United States.
Various social legislative bills intended to embody Article 25 were then
enacted, 5 one after another, after the promulgation of the 1947 Constitution.

Despite this, the view remained underlying the prewar poverty law system,
which denied the right of the people to social security, and the people's
consciousness of a right to a decent life did not materialize immediately. As
proof of this, the right to claim social security benefits for those in need of aid
was not secured under the old Livelihood Protection Act of 1946, and no such
right was legally accepted until the enactment of the present Livelihood
Protection Act of 1950, which provides a legal means to confirm such a right
and legal remedies for infringement of one's right.
IV
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES CONCERNING THE LEGAL NATURE
OF THE RIGHT TO A DECENT LIFE

Dr. Wagatsuma, who first clarified the legal nature of the right to a decent

life, highly valued the protection of social rights because he believed that they
would bring about an "important change in quality" in the nature of the
system of fundamental rights. At the same time, however, he denied that the
right to a decent life constituted a legal right, saying that it was not a concrete
5. See, e.g., the Unemployment Allowance Act (1947), Child Welfare Act (1947), Emergency
Unemployment Relief Act (1949), and the Disabled Persons Welfare Act (1949).
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and judicially enforceable right. 6 After the Japanese Supreme Court adopted
this theory in 1948 and established the precedent that Article 25 was purely a
"programmatic declaration" (that is, the provision proclaims that it is the duty
of the state to set up a policy to enable all people to enjoy minimum standards
of wholesome and cultured living but does not vest in individuals any concrete
rights), 7 theoretical development and judicial decisions easily followed this
view, and examination of the legal nature of the right to a decent life
stagnated. The Asahi case, brought to the Tokyo District Court in 1957 and
decided in favor of the plaintiff in 1960,8 interrupted this stagnation. With
this case, critical examination of the traditional prevailing theory commenced,
resulting in both a theory that tried to demonstrate the positive legal effect of
Article 25 within the confines of the "programmatic declaration" theory and a
theory that tried to demonstrate that, in opposition to the "programmatic
declaration" theory, the nature of Article 25 creates a concrete right to a
decent life. These theories examine the legal nature of the right to a decent
life from many angles and, by such examination, have encouraged various
legal advances.
To begin with, many theories agree upon the point that Article 25 has the
legal effect of guaranteeing a negative right. Thus, if people use their own
efforts to seek more cultured living and an economic standard of living higher
than the "minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living," and if the
state interferes with such efforts, all the theories recognize that such
interference should be deemed unconstitutional and excluded by the courts.
In other words, as to the guarantee of a negative right under the Constitution,
all the theories recognize the legal nature of the right to a decent life as giving
rise to judicially enforceable concrete rights. However, concerning the
guarantee of any positive right, that is, that the fundamental nature of the
provision of the right to a decent life entitles the people to demand that the
state take certain affirmative measures to ensure that the people can lead lives
worthy of human beings, the views can be divided into three basic theories.
The first theory strongly asserts that Article 25 merely imposes a purely
political and moral obligation upon the legislative branch, rather than
creating legal obligations, and that, as the people have no judicially
enforceable right against the state based on the state's failure to perform its
obligation, the provision is only "programmatic." The basic outline of this
theory is as follows: Article 25 does not invest in individuals any concrete
right, and a concrete right accrues to certain individuals only after legislation
is enacted to implement the objectives prescribed in Article 25; whether such
legislation should be enacted is completely a matter of the legislative policy of
the state; and such legislation should carry the strongest presumption of
6.

Wagatsuma, Shin Kenpd to Kihontehiinken,

MINP6

KENKY0 8 (1965).

1235 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Sept. 28, 1948), translated in J. MAKI, COURT AND
CONSTIruTIoN IN JAPAN 255 (1964).
8. Asahi v. Minister of Health and Welfare (The Asahi Case), 21 Minshfi 1043 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
May 24, 1967), revg 11 Gy5shfi 2921 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Oct. 19, 1960) and affg 14 Gy6shfi 53 (Tokyo
H. Ct., Nov. 4, 1963)); see also infra Part V.
7.

2 Keishai
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constitutionality and thus cannot be easily overridden by evidence of
competing concerns. This theory is called the "Negative Programmatic
Declaration Theory," and it completely denies the existence of judicially
enforceable positive rights under the constitutional right to a decent life. 9
The second theory criticizes the first theory by arguing that to deny
completely the legal effect of the provision for the right to a decent life is to
infringe upon the principles of social justice on which social rights are based.
This theory further asserts that the provision guarantees both the "legal
right" by which the people can demand that the Diet enact laws necessary to
maintain "the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living" and that
the state has a "legal obligation" to establish such laws. However, the second
theory holds that such rights and such obligations are abstract and do not give
rise to a means of enforcement, and that, therefore, even if such rights are
infringed or such obligations neglected, the people have no cause of action
for bringing suit claiming that such infringement or neglect constitutes a
violation of Article 25. This theory holds that the right to a decent life
becomes concrete only when it is transformed into an actual claim of right by
means of legislative enactment. If such claim of right is then infringed by the
state, the people have a cause of action for bringing suit, based on the
legislation, for infringement of the right. Indeed, we must admit that this
theory has a more positive meaning than the first one, in that it holds that if a
law that is an embodiment of Article 25 guarantees a right by which the
people can effectively demand affirmative measures, such as the supply of
benefits by the state, then the constitutional right to a decent life is embodied
by that law and takes on the nature of an actual legal right. This is, however,
nothing more than a reflection of the entitlement created by the legislation
embodying the right to a decent life, rather than the concrete legal effect of
the constitutional right to a decent life. Moreover, under this theory, if no
legislation embodies Article 25 or sufficiently ensures the standard of living
intended under Article 25, the people have no basis for bringing suits
claiming that such omissions or deficiencies are unconstitutional. After all,
this theory does not recognize that the provision for the right to a decent life
actually obligates the legislative branch to enact laws that suitably embody the
content of the right. Consequently, this theory is called the "Positive
Programmatic Declaration Theory" or the "Abstract Rights Theory."' 0
Thus, both the first and the second theories, although different in the
process of development of their logic, are in substance "programmatic
declaration theories" in that the ultimate result of each theory is to deny that
Article 25 creates a judicially enforceable concrete right. Although the
distinction between the two theories should now be clear, the fundamental
9. NIHONKOKU, KENP6JOKAN 488-89 (1953); Itoh, KihontekiJinken, 72 KOKKA GAKKAI ZASSHI 6970 (1958).
10. K. HASHIMOTO, KENP6 GENRON 238-39 (1973); Satoh, Seizonken no Hosh5Hritsu to Yosan, in
KENP6 ENSHO 60-64 (1959); Ikeda, Program Kitei ni okeru Sekkyokusei to Sh~kyokusei, 3 RIKKYO H6GAKU
30 (1961).
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logical differences between them are summarized below. First, if any claim of
right is created under a law that embodies the right to a decent life, the first
theory maintains the "programmatic declaration" view even for such claim of
right and denies that a concrete right thereby arises, while the second theory
holds that a concrete right does so arise. Second, if any law that embodies the
right to a decent life is established, the second theory holds that the right to a
decent life under the Constitution is thereby made material and takes on the
nature of a concrete legal right, whereas the first theory recognizes no such
legal effect.
The third theory asserts that, upon examination of the subject of the right,
its content, and the addressee on whom the provision imposes the legal
obligation to realize its constitutional values, section 1 of Article 25 of the
Constitution has fairly clear content that is enforceable by the courts. This
theory states 'that, given the principle that all actions of administrative
agencies must have their basis in legislation, section 1 of Article 25 of the
Constitution, even if not as clear and detailed as a legislative enactment that
directly binds administrative power, has sufficiently clear content to bind the
legislative and judicial branches. The right to a decent life is a concrete right
by which the people can demand that the legislative branch enact laws that
give suitable embodiment to the content of the right, and if the legislative
branch does not so fulfill its obligation and thereby permits infringement of
the right to a decent life, the people have the right to obtain a judicial
are
declaration that such legislative omissions and deficiencies
unconstitutional. This theory is therefore called the "Concrete Rights
Theory." '
Among these three theories, the second theory is held by a majority of the
academic world, the third theory is held by a minority, and the first theory is
supported by almost no one. However, the judicial precedents, which are
centered around the Supreme Court, are deeply inclined toward the first
theory, and thus receive strong criticism from the academic world for being
anachronistic.
I have mainly advocated the Concrete Rights Theory and have been trying
to develop its logic. There is not sufficient space here, however, to address it
in detail. Therefore I will discuss just one point in relation to the fundamental
nature of the right. This point addresses the special character of the judicial
procedure for securing the right to a decent life as a concrete right.
A special constitutional litigation theory, which holds that a court can
declare legislative omissions and deficiencies to be unconstitutional, is
necessary to overcome the difficulties of the "Programmatic Declaration
Theory." I assert that the effect of a judgment of the unconstitutionality of a
legislative omission or deficiency need not obligate the Diet to amend existing
laws or to create new legislation, but rather can oblige the Diet to express its
concrete intention in response to such judgment. The Concrete Rights
11.

A. OSUKA, SEIZONKEN RON 71 (1984).
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Theory might be criticized for being an interpretative theory based on
exceptionally strong political intentions. 2 This is because, in my view, if the
Diet expresses an intention inconsistent with the judgment, there should be
no other expectation than that such a problem ultimately will be resolved
through the political process, by the reaction and movement of the people
against the pronouncement of the Diet and by the Diet's response to that
movement. It is additionally worth noting that a certain critic argues both the
merits and problems of locating authority on this matter in the courts or in
the legislature, in light of the desire to realize constitutional values. This

critic raises an important issue at the last part of his thesis by writing,
"Considering various factors, more detailed examination is necessary
concerning whether mainly political or judicial processes should be utilized to
realize constitutional values and to make the right to a decent life a
substantive right." 13 The intent to protect constitutional values through the
operation of political processes is clearly revealed in the text of the
Constitution itself. The Constitution devotes extraordinary energy to keeping
political and administrative processes open and democratic, in accordance
with the principle of the popular sovereignty of the people, by making the
Diet the highest state power and by giving it the power to control the other
two branches of government. On the other hand, in the area of fundamental
rights, the Constitution guarantees various civil liberties, which constitute
most of the fundamental rights that have specific and concrete content. The
rule is that such rights should not be restricted by governmental power, and
restriction by legislative or other governmental powers is an exception. And
because
the Constitution
explicitly
adopts judicial
review
of
4
constitutionality,'
judicial protection of human rights is generally
guaranteed. Therefore, in the area of human rights, judicial protection of
such rights is the rule.
However, the situation concerning the protection of social rights,
including the right to a decent life, is slightly different from that of civil
liberties. The right to a decent life is guaranteed in the Constitution, and
embodiment of this right is entrusted to the legislative branch by the
Constitution.
Thus, the legislature assumes primary responsibility for
protecting that right, and, therefore, the extent of legislative involvement in
the protection of the right to a decent life should be much greater than it is
with civil liberties. If one overemphasizes this point concerning the
supremacy of the legislature, the theory gives the legislative branch complete
discretion and thereby falls into the "Negative Programmatic Declaration
Theory," which completely denies the legal effect of a constitutional right to a
decent life. However, even if we recognize the nature of the right as a
concrete right, we cannot deny that in order to protect the right to a decent
12.

Ikeda, Seizonken, in ENsHu KENP6 357, 358 (1973).
13. Ikeda, Asahi Soshj Hanketsu to sono Kenpdron teki Igi (The Judgment of Asahi Case and its
Constitutional Theoretical Significance), 374 JURIST 25 (1967).
14.

1947

CONST.

art 81.
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life, both judicial protection and political protection are interrelated
necessities. Thus, while we should make judicial protection the more basic of
the two, it is important to use both protections harmoniously. That is the
reason why we must formulate a special procedure for seeking judgments of
unconstitutionality for legislative omissions or deficiencies. Therefore, to
understand, evaluate, and argue the propriety of the content and effect of a
judgment of unconstitutionality from only the legal point of view seems
inappropriate given the fundamental nature and structure of the guarantee of
the right to a decent life that is to be secured by the judgment.
V
SURVEY OF CASE LAW CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO A DECENT LIFE

The judgment of the Supreme Court on September 29, 1948,1 5 involving
violation of the Food Control Act, states:
Paragraph I of the same article is a declaration of the responsibility of the nation ... to
manage state affairs so that all of the people can maintain the minimum standards of
wholesome and cultural living. That must, in the main, be carried out by the
enactment and enforcement of social legislation, but the maintenance and elevation of
such a standard of living must be regarded as a function of the state. That is to say,
the nation must assume that responsibility broadly toward all the people .... But the
state does not bear such an obligation concretely and materially toward the people as
individuals. 16

This judgment of the Court adopted the "Negative Programmatic
Declaration Theory" with regard to the legal nature of the right to a decent
life. This case has come to be thought of as the leading case. The main
reason why such theory was accepted as the predominant view in academia
and the courts was that, due to the defeat in World War II, the nation's
economic productivity was at a very low level, and thus the nation's economic
power was extremely weak. It was believed that it was almost impossible for
the government to maintain "the minimum standard of wholesome and
cultured living" under this extremely difficult situation. The people's low
consciousness with regard to any right to demand such welfare also must have
contributed to such thinking. Furthermore, the introduction and spread in
Japan, without due consideration, of the German view of the "Negative
Programmatic Declaration Theory,"
which was the predominant
interpretation in Germany of the right to a decent life under the first section
of Article 151 of the Weimar Constitution, may have been one of the factors
which lead to the view becoming predominant in Japan.
The Asahi case' 7 was a lawsuit for nullification of an administrative
decision in which Mr. Asahi alleged that the decision of the director of the
local welfare office to alter the level of assistance previously granted to him
was in violation of the Livelihood Protection Act. The case, however, does
have constitutional significance.
15.
16.
17.

2 Keishil 1235; see also Shokury6 Kanrilh6 (the Food Control Act), Law No. 40, 1942.
2 Keishu 1235.
21 Minshfi 1043.
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Mr. Asahi prevailed at the Tokyo District Court on October 19, 1960.18
The court held that both the standard of "livelihood protection" set by the
Minister and the decision of the local welfare office to apply the standard to
Mr. Asahi were in violation of Article 3, and of Article 8, section 2, of the
Livelihood Protection Act. Because the provisions of the Act have almost the
same content as Article 25 of the Constitution, this holding implicitly
assumes the position that administrative decisions based on the Act are
subject to judicial review of their constitutionality. Thus, although this
holding did not explicitly recognize a constitutionally concrete right to a
decent life in Article 25, in substance it implicitly assumed that Article 25 of
the Constitution created a judicially enforceable right to a decent life.
Furthermore, the court's judgment offered frequent criticism of the
"Negative Programmatic Declaration Theory." For example, it first held that
the level of a "minimum standard of living" should not be affected by the
conditions of the national budget of the time, but that, on the contrary, the
minimum standard should lead and govern the budget. This statement made
clear that the legal norm of Article 25 of the Constitution should control the
making and execution of the budget. Second, the court held that, in theory,
the level of a minimum standard of living could be objectively determined for
a specific nation at a specific time. This holding supports the theory of an
absolute standard for determining the minimum standard of living; such a
theory can be the foundation for recognition of the right to a decent life as a
legally enforceable right.
Mr. Asahi's claim was defeated on November 4, 1963, on appeal to the
Tokyo High Court, 19 which adopted the "Negative Programmatic Declaration
Theory" of the right to a decent life. First, it adopted the theory of a relative
standard for determining the minimum standard of living, as opposed to the
theory of an absolute standard adopted by the Tokyo District Court. It is true
that both theories share the assumption that historical factors have a certain
influence in determining the minimum standard of living; thus the minimum
standard of living is to be determined relatively in one sense, although
whether it is possible to determine it entirely on an objective basis is in
dispute. However, the approach of the Tokyo District Court is completely
different from that of the Tokyo High Court in its view that consideration of
the nation's finances is one of the necessary requirements in making the
evaluation. The view that determination of the budget is solely a national
political matter increases the discretion of the Diet, and thus increases the
degree of instability of the minimum standard of living, and substantially
contributes to the denial of the view that the right to a decent life under
Article 25 of the Constitution gives rise to a judicially enforceable right.
Second, although the Tokyo High Court admitted that the determination
of the standard of "livelihood protection" and of benefits pursuant to the
standard are Ermessen der Rechtmdssigkeit, that is, acts
18.
19.

11 Gy6sh6 2921.
14 Gy6shQi 53.

of administrative
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discretion that are severely restricted by law, in substance the Court inclined
towardfreies Ermessen, or free discretion, in widening the scope of permissible
discretion by emphasizing the specialized technical expertise of the minister.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Asahi case on May 24, 1967,20
also stated the following, though in dictum, which is very near to the
"Negative Programmatic Declaration Theory":
[The] standards which the Minister of Health and Welfare has found to be sufficient to
maintain the minimum standard of living ... should of course be set in accordance
with the requirements enumerated in article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Act and should
provide for protection which is sufficient to maintain minimum standards of
wholesome and cultured living as guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept of
minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living is rather abstract and relative.
Such standards will be improved as our culture and national economy develop. These
standards can be determined only after taking into consideration all these and other
variable elements. Therefore, the determination of what "minimum standards of
wholesome and cultured living" actually means [under particular circumstances] is
within the discretion of the minister of Health and Welfare. His decision does not
produce an issue as to the legality of the standards, although such a decision may
produce an issue as to the propriety of the standards which may be discussed in terms
of the political responsibility of the government in power. Only in cases where such a
decision is made in excess of or by abuse of the discretionary power conferred by the
law, so as to neglect [totally] the policy and objectives of the Constitution and the
Livelihood Protection Act by ignoring the actual conditions of life and establishing
extremely
low standards, would such a decision be subject to judicial review of its
2
legality. 1

Thus, by adopting the theory of relative standards, the Court permits wide
discretion on the part of the Minister of Health and Welfare in the
determination of standards. Although the standard set by the Minister is
subject to judicial review of its legality if such determination is made in excess
of or by abuse of the discretionary power conferred by the Act, such a case is
extremely rare. It would not be too much to say that the standard set by the
Minister is almost completely excluded from judicial review of its legality.
Thus, the Court essentially gives government officials almost completely free
discretion.
Since the Asahi case, the main issue in lawsuits involving the right to a
decent life has shifted to a constitutional challenge of decisions concerning
the qualifications for receiving welfare pensions that do not require advance
contributions. In the Makino case, Mr. Makino won in the Tokyo District
Court on July 15, 1968.22 He claimed that the provision reducing the Aged
Welfare Pension benefits of anyone whose spouse was already receiving the
same pension 23 was an unconstitutional violation of section 1 of Article 14 of
the Constitution, which guarantees equality under the law.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id., translatedin THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 796 (H. Tanaka ed. 1976).
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 20.
Makino v. Japan, 19 Gy5shfi 1196 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 15, 1968).
Kokumin Nenkin H6 (National Annuity Law), Law No. 141, 1959, art. 79(2), § 5.
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In the Horiki case, 24 Ms. Horiki claimed that the provision of the Juvenile
Allowance Law, 2 5 which prohibited parallel receipt of benefits under both the
Juvenile Allowance and the Pension for the Handicapped, was an
unconstitutional violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Although she
won in the Kobe District Court, 2 6 she lost in her appeal to the Osaka High
Court 2 7 and in her final appeal to the Supreme Court. 28 Finally, in the Miya
case, Mr. Miya claimed that the provision prohibiting parallel receipt of
benefits under the Aged Welfare Pension and the Ordinary Pension 29 violated
30
Articles 14 and 25 of the Constitution. He lost in the Tokyo District Court
3
and on appeal to the Tokyo High Court. '
The social background of these constitutional challenges was the harsh
reality that, in spite of the gradual improvement of the national pension
system for which advance contributions were not made, the benefits provided
under all pension plans were too small and did not function as sufficient
benefits for social welfare or social security.
The courts of first instance in the Makino and Horiki cases tried partially to
correct the deficiencies of the system of social welfare and social security by
utilizing the constitutional guarantee of equality under the law. Immediately
after these decisions, amendments to the National Annuity Law and the
Juvenile Allowance Law in compliance with the decisions were introduced in
order to repeal the provisions that had been in dispute.
Thereafter, however, at about the time of the judgment of the appeals
court in Horiki, the social mood in favor of funding welfare lessened, and, in
accordance with that change of mood, increasing numbers ofjudgments were
issued that confirmed on the basis of broad legislative discretion the
constitutionality of the provisions prohibiting parallel receipt of pensions or
other assistance.
It is further worth noting that the decision of the appellate court in Horiki
separated section 1 from section 2 of Article 25. As for section 2, the court,
having accepted broad legislative discretion, held that legislative
determination would be subject to judicial review of its constitutionality only
in cases where the determination was obviously made in excess or by abuse of
the discretion conferred by the Constitution, such as when a decision of the
legislature was clearly arbitrary and constituted a retreat from the level of the
national standard of living. The court adopted what is called the "standard of
clear violation for judicial review." In contrast, as to section 1 of Article 25,
the court held that more strict scrutiny of laws would be needed because
24. Horiki v. Governor of Hyogo Prefecture, 36 Minshu 1235 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,July 7, 1982) (rev'g
23 Gy6shu 711 (Kobe Dist. Ct., Sept. 20, 1972) and aff'g 26 Gy6shu 1268 (Osaka H. Ct., Nov. 10,
1975)).
25. Jid6 Fuy5 Teate H6 (Juvenile Allowance Law), Law No. 238, 1961, art. 4, § 3, no. 3.
26. 23 Gy6shui 711.
27. 26 Gy6shO 1268.
28. 36 MinshOi 1235.
29. National Annuity Law, arts. 65, 79(2), § 6.
30. 25 Gy6shfi 274 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Apr. 24, 1974).
31. 32 Gy6shii 593 (Tokyo H. Ct., Apr. 22, 1981).
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section 1 requires utilization of an absolute standard for determining the
"minimum standard for wholesome and cultured living."
The Supreme Court in Horiki did not approve these separate
interpretations of sections 1 and 2 of Article 25, and instead affirmed the
broad discretion of the legislature and applied the "standard of clear violation
for judicial review" to all laws covered by Article 25. The doctrine of broad
legislative discretion as affirmed by the Court means that legislative decisions
are subject to judicial review only in such exceptional cases as where
legislation is made in excess or by abuse of the discretion conferred by the
Constitution.
Generally then, under the theory of legislative discretion based on the
concept offreies Ermessen, or free discretion, the objects of legislative decisions
basically cannot be cognizable as legal issues nor be subject to judicial review;
thus, only very exceptional cases can be subject to judicial review. Therefore,
it is fair to say that the Supreme Court, which was willing to speak in terms of
"broad legislative discretion," adopted the interpretation that, as a rule,
Article 25 protects no judicially enforceable right.
VI
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF SOCIAL
RIGHTS

In this section I would like to point out that because of the guarantee in
the Constitution of social rights, including the right to a decent life, the
protection of the people's rights and freedoms has been enriched qualitatively
and quantitatively. Such guarantees show vast potential to improve the
system of protection of human rights in line with changing social
circumstances.
First, the constitutional protection of civil liberties has been increasingly
reinforced by the inclusion of social rights in the Bill of Rights. Social rights
newly create the foundation for the actual exercise of civil liberties, just as the
right to a decent life improves, even if at a minimum, the life and subsistence
of the people.
Second, the provisions of the Constitution relating to social rights have a
peculiar structure that allows such provisions to function simultaneously as
guarantees of civil liberties and of social rights. Historically, social rights have
been recognized to the extent that they supplement the protection of civil
liberties. Thus, the manner of exercise of social rights is inevitably
conditioned by civil liberties accompanying such social rights. On the other
hand, social rights can enrich the guarantee of civil liberties.
As an example, let me explain this point in connection with the right to
work, which is guaranteed under Article 27 of the Constitution. The right to
work, as a social right, is generally defined as "the right to demand from the
state opportunities to work, if people of desire and ability are not employed
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by private companies." 3 2 Like other provisions relating to social rights,
Article 27 also guarantees a civil liberty, the freedom to work, which includes
the freedom to choose among employment opportunities and the right to
select among occupations. The positive measure by the government to
protect the right to work should respect the freedom to choose occupations
by ensuring that there are several kinds of employment available, from
physical labor to mental labor, so that unemployed persons can select suitable
occupations in consideration of their abilities and qualifications.
People cannot be content, or may even feel agony in some cases, if they
must toil in occupations not suitable to their natures, even if their lives are
economically secure. It is aptly said that "man cannot live by bread alone."
The protection of the right to work can be enriched not just by the mere
chance to work, but by the provision of abundant occupational opportunities
worthy of human beings, so that people can be freed as much as possible from
work not suitable to their natures. I call such a need the "preservation of the
cultural aspect of work."
Third, in certain social domains where social rights and civil liberties are
closely interconnected, every governmental decision should of necessity be
made with the participation of the persons enjoying such civil liberties. For
instance, governmental decisions on educational matters, which implicate the
social right to receive education and the closely related civil liberty of freedom
of education, should require the direct or indirect participation of those in the
education profession, especially teachers.
The reason for such participation is that when the "hardware" conditions
of education (such as the facilities to be provided or the financing of
education) are closely related to the "software" conditions (such as the
content or manner of education), then the freedom of education has to
govern the hardware conditions and autonomy of education is strongly
required. Even if the government should have jurisdiction over the hardware
conditions of education, the decisions on such matters should not be wholly
entrusted to the government, but should necessarily be made, directly or
indirectly, with the participation of those in the education profession. In this
way, from the interconnection of the social right and the civil liberty, the right
of those in the education profession to participate in educational decisions
emerges.
Fourth, the Article 26 right to receive education can theoretically create
the right to require the government to establish educational systems in which
"educational neutrality" is realized. Educational neutrality requires that the
content of education be decided upon and attained by those in the education
profession, independent of religious, political, or administrative authorities or
forces. Such a requirement has to be located among civil liberties, for the
core of the doctrine is freedom from state interference. Educational
neutrality is required by Article 26 of the Constitution and therefore partly
32.

Ishii, Rtddken, I R6o6H6

No KENKY0

98 (1967).
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overlaps the right to receive education as a social right. Thus, we can
conceive the right to demand establishment by the state of systems that
respect and realize this requirement. The public election of members to the
board of education, which was abolished in 1956, can be classified as one of
the democratic institutions by which such a requirement is realized and which
the government has a legal obligation to establish and maintain.
Fifth, attachment of social rights characteristics to rights traditionally
understood as civil liberties has become an important issue. For example, the
social right aspect of the freedom of expression is the right to know or to
require information disclosure based on the right to know. If the free flow of
information is hindered by excessive concealment of information by the
government or by the monopoly on information held by information
industries, the guarantee of the freedom of expression, such as the right to
see or hear what one wants, cannot function effectively. Therefore, the right
to know or the right to require information disclosure, insofar as either
requires affirmative disclosure of information, can surely play a significant
role in correcting such distortions in the marketplace of ideas. This, then,
represents the new merit and potential to be accrued by guaranteeing social
rights.
However, we must be aware of the risk that, through aspects of social
rights, the government can interfere with and thereby undermine civil
liberties. The domain of freedom should be maintained and controlled by
each individual without aid of the government; a strong consciousness of
freedom can be nourished only under such conditions. Accordingly, each
addition of social rights characteristics to civil liberties contains the risk of
corruption of liberalism. Therefore, the addition of social rights
characteristics to the traditional civil liberties should be restricted to cases
where it is necessary to correct clear and significant distortions in the
functioning of civil liberties, and their addition should be restricted to the
minimum extent necessary.
VII
CONCLUSION

Generally, history shows that the protection of the right to a decent life
begins with a protection with respect to economic life. Once it came to be
impossible for workers without property and needy people to enjoy freedom
or rights under the abuses of capitalism, social rights were developed as a
nurturing device to fill the gaps left by civil liberties, both to improve such a
situation and to enable the people to enjoy their freedom and rights. Because
of this history, the application of the guarantee of the right to a decent life has
been restricted mainly to the area of economic life. The protection has been
pursued in such a manner that it does not reach the domain of individual
freedom.
Additionally, under the social circumstances of past historical periods, the
manner of guaranteeing social rights creates the minimum conditions
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necessary to lead a life worthy of a human being. For this reason we can say
that the theory of the right to a decent life was initially intended to make
breakthroughs on poverty. Since then the theory has spawned further
theories requiring the provision of the conditions necessary for securing
human dignity, but its basic aim has remained as initially intended.
Recently, however, in the process of pursuing economic growth,
environmental pollution and every kind of social evil have developed, and
these have endangered the subsistence and life worthy of human beings. The
self-alienation of people, which necessarily accompanies a highly developed
industrial society, is one such example. The characteristic of such alienation,
under which human beings are occupied and controlled by that which they
have produced, is the forfeiture of humanity. As autonomous judgments or
actions are not needed and as people lack opportunities to exercise their
creative abilities, they have become passive tools of the organization and
function of society.
The constitutional basis for challenging these various threats to the
culturally satisfying life, in which a person can maintain a comfortable life and
utilize his creativity, and for challenging other cultural poverties, is the right
to a decent life; more specifically, the cultural aspect of the right to a decent
life is the heart of the right.
If the real material, economic, and social conditions of life can be defined
as the objective conditions of human life, the spiritual or cultural conditions
of life can be called the subjective conditions of human life. These subjective
conditions of life relate to aspects of the quality of life. Thus, matters such as
whether the dignity of the people is being secured, whether the people are
alienated, and whether their conditions of life are worthy of them are the main
subjects for examination. The government should affirmatively take care of
the cultural aspects, as well as the economic aspects, of human life. This is the
legal effect of social rights. However, the government should take affirmative
measures in the area of "hardware" conditions in order to maintain and
improve the cultural life of human beings, but should not in the area of
"software" conditions. As the basis for these trends, there lies the realization
that under today's social circumstances, humanity's basic need for dignity
cannot be secured without governmental measures ensuring the fulfillment of
basic cultural needs. Thus, theoretical development of these cultural aspects
of the right to a decent life seems to be one of the most important tasks in
development of the theory concerning the right to a decent life.

